Hungary has a low level of union density – under 10%. Trade unionism is also fragmented, with five confederations, MaSZSZ, SZEF, ÉSZT, LIGA and MOSZ, which compete with one another in some areas.
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Figures from the 2015 Hungarian labour force survey indicate that 329,000 of the employed workforce are in trade unions, equivalent to 9.0% of all employees.[1] The unions themselves report having significantly more than this – around 400,000, and one reason is that the confederations, especially those which emerged from the union confederation SZOT, which was in existence before 1989 (see below), have a proportion of members who are pensioners.
The five confederations are:
- MaSZSZ (110,000 members);
- LIGA (100,200 members);
- ÉSZT (76,000 members); [2]
- SZEF (59,000 members); and
- MOSZ – also known as Munkástanácsok (50,000 members).
These figures are not official figures but provided by the confederations themselves and in the case of ÉSZT and MOSZ are likely to be an overestimate, as they date from 2014. There are also a number of independent unions outside the confederations.
The five confederations have different histories. Two, SZEF and ÉSZT, emerged as reformed organisations from the unified trade union confederation SZOT, which existed before 1989. MaSZSZ, was created as the result of a merger in 2015 between two confederations, MSZOSZ and ASZSZ, (see below) which had also emerged from SZOT. However, two, LIGA and MOSZ, grew out of a combination of anti-communist activists and local protest movements.
The divisions between the three reformed trade union confederations are essentially that they cover different parts of the economy. MaSZSZ represents workers in manufacturing, transport, energy and private services, while SZEF and ÉSZT cover public service employees, both those with special status as civil servants and normal employees. The difference between the two confederations is that ÉSZT organises employees in higher education and research institutes only, while SZEF organises public service employees in health, social services, other parts of education and local and central government.
LIGA and MOSZ both represent workers across the economy in both the public and private sectors, and are in competition for members, both with one another and with the reformed unions.
All five confederations have industry-based unions affiliated to them. MaSZSZ has 31 affiliated unions, including the metalworkers’ union VASAS, the mining and energy workers’ union BDSZ, which also has members in the clothing and textile industries, and the chemical workers’ union VDSZ. These unions are grouped in nine industry and service sectors. SZEF has 12 affiliated unions, including one of the teachers’ unions (PSZ) and the nursery workers’ union (BDDSZ).[3] ÉSZT has eight affiliates, of which the largest is FDSZ, which organises employees in higher education, including teachers, researchers and administrative staff.
LIGA and MOSZ present the information in a different way on their websites, with both stating that they have almost 100 member organisations, although they do not list their affiliates.
There have been major differences between the confederations, particularly between the reformed confederations on one side and LIGA and MOSZ on the other. This has been particularly noticeable in their relations with the FIDESZ party, led by Viktor Orbán, which has been in power in Hungary since 2010.
In 2006 and 2007, the fact that LIGA and MOSZ supported demonstrations and organised strikes against the austerity policies of the socialist-liberal government at a time of overall political unrest led to a strengthening of links between LIGA and FIDESZ.[4] Following the election of 2010, which produced a landslide win for FIDESZ and its coalition partner, the Christian Democratic Party KDNP, the new government introduced a revised Labour Code that weakened the position of unions. LIGA and MOSZ continued to negotiate with the government, while the other confederations were not included in the discussions, and the existing tripartite structure was dismantled. Although MSZOSZ (now part of MaSZSZ and at that time the largest of the reformed confederations) later joined LIGA and MOSZ in discussions on the proposed new Labour Code, and finally signed an agreement on a revised version with them, the reformed confederations continued to believe that the government gave preference to LIGA.[5]
This was one of the main reasons why three of the reformed confederations, MSZOSZ, another industrial confederation ASZSZ and the public sector confederation SZEF, announced in May 2013 that they planned to merge. Their “unification statement” specifically referred to the “divisive” policy of some governments towards the unions, and said that since 2010 the FIDESZ-led government had given “exclusive preference” to some unions, while others were “ignored”.[6]
In fact, in the end only two of the three confederations, MSZOSZ and ASZSZ, finally agreed to merge, with the congress of the third confederation, SZEF, narrowly voting against a merger in November 2014. In addition, a number of unions within MSZOSZ and ASZSZ, including the postal workers’ union, were unhappy with the merger plans and switched confederation to LIGA or became independent.[7] As a result, MaSZSZ, the new confederation which result from the merger (completed in February 2015), included many fewer members than initially planned.
The years since the merger have seen some of examples of cooperation between the confederations, but also ongoing differences. In 2016, all five confederations issued a joint statement protesting against government plans to close a number of professional government-linked institutions.[8] In 2017, there was further joint lobbying of the government, with a common push for pay increases at state-owned companies, and it seemed as though a strategy might be emerging of using the two confederations with the best links to the government – MOSZ and LIGA – to push for jointly agreed objectives. [9]
However, in 2018 and 2019, the differences between the confederations became more evident over three separate issues: legislation changing the taxation of some non-wage benefits (the so-called cafeteria law), where a joint position had been agreed, but the leadership of MOSZ and LIGA then held separate meetings with the government; an agreement increasing the national minimum wage, which was signed at the end of 2018 by MOSZ and LIGA but not by MaSZSZ; and new legislation on overtime, dubbed the “Slave Act”, which led to a series of major demonstrations, which were backed by MaSZSZ, SZEF and ÉSZT and some individual unions, but not supported by MOSZ.[10]
These policy differences coupled sometimes with personal and organisational disputes led some unions to change their allegiances in 2018, with a police union FRSZ leaving LIGA for MOSZ, while teachers’ union PDSZ left LIGA without joining another confederation.[11]
In formal terms, the confederations emphasise their political neutrality. The merger document of MaSZSZ states that it “does not carry out direct political activities, is independent of parties and does not provide financial support to them”.[12] LIGA lists “independence from political parties” as one of its principle values in its statutes.[13] SZEF states on its website that, it is “open to dialogue with all political parties and other organisations… but does not commit itself to any political force”.[14] And ÉSZT describes “party political independence” as a basic founding principle of the organisation.[15] MOSZ is slightly different as it states that its policies are based on Christian values.[16]
Union membership declined sharply over the 1990s and the decline has not ended. The labour force survey figures show a continuing fall in overall union density since the start of the millennium dropping from 19.7% in 2001 to 16.9% in 2004, 12.0% in 2009 and 9.0% in 2015.[17]
There are, however, significant differences between industries in in terms of union organisation, with the highest density rates in the energy industry (electricity, gas and steam) at 29.0%, transportation and storage – 22.3%, education – 19.0%, health – 17.7% and mining and quarrying – 16.7%. Unusually public administration is not among this group. Union density here is only just above average at 10.7%.One reason for this is that the Ministry of the Interior ended the automatic deduction of union subscriptions by the employer (the check-off system).[18] Between 2009 and 2015 union density in public administration halved from 22.4% to 10.7%.
Union density is higher among women – at 9.3% – than among men – at 8.8%.
[1] HCSO, Labour Force Survey 2015. II. quarterly supplementary survey
https://www.ksh.hu/stadat_evkozi_9_1 (Accessed 01.08.2019)
[2] Other than the LIGA figures which come from the LIGA Website http://www.liganet.hu/page/2/html/kik-vagyunk.html (Accessed 01.08.2019), the source of the figures is Annual Review 2018 of Labour Relations and Social Dialogue: Hungary, by László Neumann, FES 2019 http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/bratislava/15357.pdf (Accessed 01.08.2019). The figure from the SZEF website https://szef.hu/rolunk/kik-vagyunk (Accessed 01.08.2019), relating to 2015 is 70,000
[3] Union websites MaSZSZ: https://www.szakszervezet.net/hu/tagszervezetek SZEF: https://szef.hu/tagszervezetek-es-retegszervezetek/tagszervezetek ÉSZT: https://www.eszt.hu/rolunk/szervezetunk/tagszervezeteink.html
[4] See: Tóth, András: The collapse of the post-socialist industrial relations system in Hungary. SEER, 2013. No. 1. pp 5-19
[5] See The New Hungarian Labour Code - Background, Conflicts, Compromises by András Tóth, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Budapest, 2012
[6] See Unification statement http://www.autonomok.hu/hirek/unification_statement/
[7] Hungary - labour relations and social dialogue annual review 2014 by Ildikó Krén, FES 2015 http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/bratislava/11547.pdf (Accessed 04.08.2019) and Hungary - labour relations and social dialogue annual review 2015 by Ildikó Krén FES 2016 http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/bratislava/12444.pdf (Accessed 04.08.2019)
[8] Annual Review 2016 of Labour Relations and Social Dialogue: Hungary, by László Neumann, FES 2017 http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/bratislava/13196.pdf (Accessed 04.08.2019)
[9] Annual Review 2017of Labour Relations and Social Dialogue: Hungary, by László Neumann, FES 2018 http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/bratislava/14470.pdf (Accessed 04.08.2019)
[10] Annual Review 2018 of Labour Relations and Social Dialogue: Hungary, by László Neumann, FES 2019 http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/bratislava/15357.pdf (Accessed 01.08.2019).
[11] ibid
[12] MaSZSZ website – Foundation https://www.szakszervezet.net/hu/rolunk/a-szovetseg-celja (Accessed 08.08.2019)
[13] LIGA Statutes http://www.liganet.hu/news/5543/ASZ_2017.nov.30.pdf (Accessed 08.08.2019)
[14] SZEF website – Who are we? https://szef.hu/rolunk/kik-vagyunk (Accessed 08.08.2019)
[15] ÉSZT website – History https://www.eszt.hu/rolunk/tortenelem.html (Accessed 08.08.2019)
[16] MOSZ website – Who we are https://munkastanacsok.hu/about/ (Accessed 08.08.2019)
[17] See Szakszervezeti stratégia és megújulás (Trade union strategy and renewal) by Ágnes Szabó-Morvai, November 2010 and HCSO, Labour Force Survey 2015. II. Quarterly supplementary survey
https://www.ksh.hu/stadat_evkozi_9_1 (Accessed 08.08.2019)
[18] See Neglected by the state: the Hungarian experience of collective bargaining by Szilvia Borbély and László Neumann in Collective bargaining in Europe: towards an endgame, edited by Torsten Müller, Kurt Vandaele and Jeremy Waddington, ETUI, 2019
Collective bargaining covers around a fifth of all employees and takes place primarily at company/organisation level, despite considerable efforts by both unions and previous governments to encourage industry level bargaining. The tripartite discussions on the minimum wage continue to be important to the unions, although they are no longer binding on the government.
The framework
There are two sources of statistics on the coverage of collective bargaining: those from the labour force survey; and those from the register of collective agreements collected by the Ministry of National Economy (Nemzetgazdasági
Minisztérium).
As a recent study undertaken for the ETUI points out, the figures based on the register of collective agreements may be an over-statement, as negotiators often do not provide up-to-date information, particularly when agreements end.[1] The Ministry of National Economy figures show that in August 2019 there were 2,869 current collective agreements registered.[2] In total these agreements covered 6,023 companies and organisations and 815,000 employees. [3] With the average total number of employees in 2018 at 4,003,900,[4] this produces a collective bargaining coverage rate of 20.4%.
The labour force survey figures are very similar, with 20.6% of employees aged 15 to 64 indicating in 2015 that there was a collective agreement at work.[5] However, this figure is unlikely to be precise, as a further 22.1% of those responding indicated that they did not know whether there was a collective agreement at their workplace.
Although the exact degree of coverage of collective agreements is uncertain, there is no doubt about the relative importance of industry and company/organisation level bargaining. The register shows that the vast majority of the 2,869 agreements were signed by a single organisation, either a company –1,008 agreements – or a single state institution (budgetary authority, as it is described in the statistics), like a school or a museum – 1,773 agreements. In the non-state sector, there were only 85 multi-employer agreements, most signed by groups of companies but some signed by employers’ associations, like the chemical industry or the water industry. In the state sector, there were only two multi-employer agreements, including one for public hospitals, signed in December 2017.
Single employer agreements also dominate in terms of employees covered. In the company sector, single employer agreements covered 449,000 employees compared with 196,000 employees covered by multi-employer agreements. In the state sector, single-employer agreements are even more dominant. The figures from the register show that multi-employer agreements covered only 320 out of the 245,000 employees covered by state-sector collective agreements, although these figures do not include the hospital agreement.
The central role of single employer agreements comes despite efforts by past governments to strengthen industry-level bargaining. There are 23 official sectoral social dialogue committees, known as ÁPBs, made up of employers’ associations and unions. However, the FIDESZ-led government has been less supportive of this structure and has significantly reduced funding to the committees leading to their virtual collapse.[6] The prevailing attitude of employers is a reluctance to join employers’ organisations or to authorise them to conclude industry agreements.
The government is able to extend collective agreements to all employees in an industry in certain circumstances – the request must be made by both parties and they must be able to show that the agreement already covers a majority of employees in the industry. However, this power has not been widely used and currently only two agreements, covering the construction industry and hotels and catering are extended in this way. These two extensions together cover 188,000 employees (112,000 construction and 76,000 hotels and catering), 42% of all private sector employees covered by collective bargaining.[7]
At national level, until 2011, unions were able to influence bargaining developments through a tripartite body called the National Interest Reconciliation Council (OÉT). Unions, employers and government met in the OÉT to agree the national minimum wage rates for the coming year and the OÉT also had an important role in making recommendations on the proposed level of pay increases to lower-level negotiators, although these recommendations were not binding. However in 2011 and against the opposition of the unions, the FIDESZ-led government replaced the OÉT with a new body, the National Economic and Social Council, NGTT, consisting of a much wider range of organisations, including chambers of commerce, civic organisations and churches, alongside the unions and employers.
Direct tripartite discussions were to some degree restored with the establishment in 2012 of a new body, the Standing Consultative Forum (VFK), to discuss employment issues in the private sector. All three union confederations with membership in the private sector, MaSZSZ, LIGA and MOSZ, are members. Its role is more limited than the former OÉT, but it provides a forum in which negotiations on the minimum wage can take place, although, if there is no agreement, the final decision is taken by the government (see below). In 2018 a comparable consultative body was established for the state sector (KVFK)
Who negotiates and when?
Negotiations at both company and industry level are in most cases between employers or employers’ associations and the unions. However, under the revised Labour Code, introduced in 2012, works councils can negotiate agreements with the employer where there is no union at the workplace and it is not covered by a collective agreement. The one important exception is that these agreements cannot cover pay.[8]
The revised Labour Code also altered the rules on which unions have a right to bargaining. It is now union membership, and no longer support in works council elections, that is the key to representativeness. Trade unions can now only conclude collective agreements at company level if their membership exceeds 10% of those employed at the company. The same 10% rule also applies to industry level agreements, where unions must have 10% of those employed in the industry to be able to reach an agreement. Where there are several unions with at least 10% membership, they must cooperate to reach a single agreement
Collective agreements setting a range of issues normally last for two years, although they are sometimes for an unlimited period. However, agreements on pay increases at company level, where these exist, are usually annual.
The subject of the negotiations
Collective agreements typically cover pay, working conditions and procedural issues. However, a significant proportion of company collective agreements in Hungary do not deal with pay, which may be dealt with through local less formal deals, and is also heavily influenced by increases in the national minimum wage (see below). Many agreements simply reproduce the terms of the Labour Code.
One indication of the limited impact of collective agreements is provided by the labour force survey. This asked those covered by a collective agreement whether it had an impact on their pay or their working conditions. In total, just over half (56.8%) stated that collective bargaining affected their pay and almost the same proportion (56.1%) said that it affected their working conditions.[9]
The 2012 Labour Code introduced significant restrictions on what can be negotiated in companies owned by the state and local government bodies. In many areas, including working time, severance pay and notice periods, it is impossible for a collective agreement for these public bodies to include terms which improve on the minimum set out by law. This limitation also applies to trade union representatives’ rights to time-off and protection against dismissal (see section on workplace representation).
Hungary’s national minimum wage is set by government decree, after formal consultation with the NGTT, the consultative body, which includes churches and other civic bodies, as well as unions and employers. In practice, the key negotiations take place in the VFK, the company-sector tripartite body, which includes representatives of the private sector unions, employers and the government (see above). It there is an agreement on the rate, it is presented to the NGTT for formal consultation, and then implemented by the government. If there is no agreement, the government will make its own proposal to NGTT. In all cases the final decision lies with the government.
The minimum wage arrangements in Hungary are unusual because they set both a basis and a higher minimum rate. The higher minimum rate, known as the guaranteed minimum, must be paid to all employees in jobs requiring at least completed secondary education.
[1] Neglected by the state: the Hungarian experience of collective bargaining by Szilvia Borbély and László Neumann in Collective bargaining in Europe: towards an endgame, edited by Torsten Müller, Kurt Vandaele and Jeremy Waddington, ETUI, 2019
[2] Munkaügyi Kapcsolatok Információs Rendszer: Kollektív szerződések elektronikus nyilvántartó könyv (Labour Relations Information System: Collective agreements electronic register)
http://mkir.gov.hu/ksznyilv.htm (Accessed 09.09.2019)
[3] Munkaügyi Kapcsolatok Információs Rendszer: Kollektív szerződések tartalmára vonatkozó online lekérdezések Nyilvántartásba vett kollektív szerződések (Labour Relations Information System: Registered collective agreements) http://www.mkir.gov.hu/lcinternet.php (Accessed 19 August 2014)
[4] HCSO Table 2.1. 9 Employed persons by status in employment
[5] This and the subsequent figures are from HCSO, Labour Force Survey 2015. II. quarterly supplementary survey https://www.ksh.hu/stadat_evkozi_9_1 (Accessed 01.08.2019)
[6] Annual Review 2018 of Labour Relations and Social Dialogue: Hungary, by László Neumann, FES 2019 http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/bratislava/15357.pdf (Accessed 01.08.2019).
[7] Munkaügyi Kapcsolatok Információs Rendszer: Kollektív szerződések tartalmára vonatkozó online lekérdezések: KSZ lefedettséggel kapcsolatos listák (Labour Relations Information System: Collective agreement coverage lists) http://www.mkir.gov.hu/lcinternet.php (Accessed 19 August 2014)
[8] See The New Hungarian Labour Code - Background, Conflicts, Compromises by András Tóth, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Budapest, 2012
[9] HCSO, Labour Force Survey 2015. II. quarterly supplementary survey https://www.ksh.hu/stadat_evkozi_9_1 (Accessed 01.08.2019)
Workplace representation in Hungary is provided by both local trade unions and elected works councils with the balance between the two varying over time. Under the revised Labour Code, introduced in 2012, unions retained negotiating rights but lost their monitoring powers and their right to be informed and consulted. Works councils have information and consultation rights but in practice often find it difficult to influence company decisions.
Works councils, drawing heavily on the experience in Germany, were first introduced in 1992. However, they had fewer powers than in Germany – joint decision making (codetermination) was limited to the use of company social funds. In addition, to take account of the existing Hungarian situation, local workplace unions were left with some rights in the area of information and consultation. The powers of both local unions and works councils have fluctuated with the changing political complexion of governments since 1998, with left-wing governments favouring the unions and right-wing governments giving greater rights to works councils. The revised Labour Code, introduced by the FIDESZ-led government in 2012, removed rights from the unions, although in some areas the position of the works councils was also weakened.
In practice there must be some doubt as to whether the difference has been as great is it appears. A survey published by a Hungarian researcher Béla Benyó in 2003 found that representation through works councils went hand in hand with a union presence. Only 9% of works councils were at workplaces without a union and 70% of works councils were either entirely made up of trade unionists or overwhelmingly made up of them.[1] In evaluating these figures it is important to bear in mind the fact that until 2012 Hungarian legislation based union recognition for bargaining on the results of works council elections.
Figures from the 2015 labour force survey show that a union presence at work was more widespread than the existence of a works council. One in four respondents (25.1%) said that there was a union at their workplace, compared with just over one in six (17.9%) who said there was a works council or a works representative.[2]
Figures from Eurofound’s 2013 European Company Survey show that 16% of establishments in Hungary with at least 10 employees have some form of official employee representation. This may be either through the union or through the works council. The Hungarian figure is precisely half the EU28 average of 32%. As elsewhere in Europe, larger organisations are much more likely to have such a structure than smaller ones. The survey shows 81% of establishments with more than 250 employees having representation, and 45% of those with between 50 and 249 employees. However in smaller workplaces in Hungary, those with between 10 and 49 employees, only 11% have employee representation.[3]
Numbers and structure
The structure of the workplace trade union body depends on the internal rules of the union. However, the number of union representatives protected against dismissal is now laid down in the Labour Code (see below).
Works councils, which are entirely employee bodies, are to be set up in any company or any part of a company operating independently with more than 50 employees. In companies or workplaces with between 15 and 50 employees a works representative is to be elected. Numbers are calculated using the average over the previous six months on a headcount basis, with both full-time and part-time employees counting equally. Agency workers are not included in the total.
The number of works council members increases with the size of the workforce as follows:
Number employed |
Number of members |
51-100 |
3 |
101-300 |
5 |
301-500 |
7 |
501-1,000 |
9 |
1,001-2,000 |
11 |
2,000+ |
13 |
The legislation does not say how often works councils should meet and most meet relatively infrequently. However, the law says that the employer must provide the works council with information on a range of issues at least twice a year, which means that there should be at least two meetings a year.
Tasks and rights
The workplace trade union representatives have a range of rights, although the revised Labour Code gave some of their previous rights to the works council. The union continues to have the sole right to negotiate collective agreements covering wages, although works councils have more limited negotiating rights where there are no trade unions present (see section on collective bargaining).
Until the changes introduced by the 2012 Labour Code, the union workplace representatives had to be consulted over major issues affecting employment, including job cuts and organisational changes, including the “transfer of undertakings”. However, under the current rules, union representatives only have a right to request information and express their views. There is no longer an obligation for them to be consulted.
The union has the right to represent its members, including before the courts, to protect their interests. However, the local union representative is no longer responsible for monitoring compliance with the provisions of employment regulations as was the case in the past. Under the terms of the revised Labour Code, this responsibility has passed to the works council.
The employer must provide the works council with information about the following issues at least twice a year:
- fundamental issues affecting the employer’s economic position;
- developments in wage and salary payments, and the impact of these payments on the company’s cash position, the characteristics of the workforce, the use of working time and working conditions; and
- the number of teleworkers and agency workers and the tasks that they perform.
The works council can ask for documents relating to these issues and more generally about concerns relating to the economic and social interests of the employees.
The employer must also consult the works council in advance about plans for measures that will have an impact on a large number of employees, in particular:
- restructuring, outsourcing or privatisation;
- the introduction of new investment, including new technology;
- the processing and protection of personal data on employees;
- the implementation of employee surveillance;
- health and safety;
- new methods of work organisation and the setting of performance norms;
- training and education plans;
- job assistance subsidies;
- rehabilitation for disabled workers;
- working arrangements;
- pay principles;
- measures to protect the environment; and
- measures to support equal treatment and the coordination of work and family life.
However, while there is an obligation to consult on these issues and the Labour Code states that consultation should take place “with a view to reaching agreement”, there is no obligation to reach agreement. The provision which stated that action taken by the employer without consultation was invalid and could be taken to court, has been removed in the revised Labour Code. It also shortened the period between the start of consultation and the action being taken from 15 to seven days, although the timescale is different for redundancies and business transfers.
In the case of redundancies, the employer is obliged to give notice of the plans at least seven days before starting negotiations and not to take a decision for at least 15 days after the negotiations have started. For business transfers the employer must provide information 15 days before a transfer.
In practice, works councils have only a limited opportunity to influence company decisions. Information is often provided only at the meeting, giving the works council little opportunity to respond.
The works council has a right to decide jointly with the employer on the use of any social funds. However, the right also to decide jointly on the utilisation of buildings or equipment for social purposes (holidays, canteens etc), was removed in the 2012 Labour Code.
The works council must inform employees about its activities at least twice a year.
Election and term of office
The choice and term of office of workplace union representatives is an internal issue for the union.
The arrangements for the works council elections, on the other hand, are meticulously regulated by the law. Members must be nominated by either 10% of the employees or at least 50 employees, or by the local union organisation at the company. Members are elected in a secret ballot run by an election committee organised by the employees. All employees at the workplace have a right to vote, but only those with six months’ service are entitled to stand as candidates. Employers and those with rights to appoint and dismiss employees may not stand as candidates.
The term of office is five years. (It was three years under the previous Labour Code).
Protection against dismissal
Before a trade union representative can be dismissed or moved the employer must get the approval of the higher trade union body to which the representative is responsible. The situation is similar for the chair of the works council. He or she can only be dismissed or transferred with the consent of the works council. However, the 2012 Labour Code reduced the number of trade union representatives and works council members protected in this way.
Whereas in the past all elected trade union officials at the workplace were protected, under the 2012 Labour Code the union must designate specific individuals who will be protected and the number varies with the size of the workforce (see table). It is possible to negotiate improvements in this area (other than in state and local government owned companies – where the limits apply absolutely), but in most cases unions are unlikely to be strong enough to do so. A study published in 2013 suggested that these limits had a substantial impact on the number of trade union representatives at company level, with the numbers falling in one case from 110 to six.[4]
Number of employees |
Number of union officials protected |
Fewer than 500 |
2 |
500 to 1,000 |
3 |
1,001 to 2,000 |
4 |
2,001 to 4,000 |
5 |
More than 4,000 |
6 |
In the case of the works council, protection against dismissal and transfer has also been reduced by the 2012 Labour Code. It formerly applied to the whole works council. It now only applies to the chair.
Time off and other resources
Under the 2012 Labour Code the designated union representatives at the workplace are entitled to one hour per month release from normal duties for every two members. (This is a reduction of a quarter, compared with the situation previously, when it was two hours a month for every three members). In the past, the union could be compensated in cash if these hours were not taken up, although only up to a maximum of half of the available time, and this was a significant source of union income. Under the 2012 Labour Code, this possibility has been abolished.
The union should also be given access to rooms on the premises for trade union activities.
Works council members are to be released from their normal duties for 10% of their monthly working time, with 15% for the chair of the works council. (Chairs in companies employing more than 1,000 are completely released from their normal duties.) The employer should also pay for the necessary costs of the works council on a jointly agreed basis.
Training rights
The Labour Code does not provide any specific training rights for either local trade union representatives or works council members.
Representation at group level
A central works council at the headquarters of a company can be set up if there are several works councils covering the same employer. In the past, this only applied if the different works councils were in the same legally registered company. However, under the 2012 Labour Code a corporate-level works council can be set up in a group of companies. The members are designated by the works councils (central works council), or by the central works councils and/or works councils (corporate-level works council).However, these higher-level bodies cannot have more than 15 members.
Links between local union representatives depend on the union.
[1] See Works councils examined by András Tóth, Youcef Ghellab and László Neumann, EIRO, February 2004 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2004/01/feature/hu0401106f.htm
[2] HCSO, Labour Force Survey 2015. II. quarterly supplementary survey
https://www.ksh.hu/stadat_evkozi_9_1 (Accessed 01.08.2019)
[3] Eurofound (2015), Third European Company Survey – Overview report: Workplace practices – Patterns, performance and well-being, Figures for Table 44
[4] See: Nacsa, Beata – László Neumann: Hungary: The reduction of social democracy and employment. In: Lerais, Frédéric et. al.: Social democracy under the strain of crisis. An essay of international comparison. Paris: Institut de Recherches Économiques et Sociales (IRES). 2013, pp. 94-108. http://www.ires.fr/images/files/DocumentsTravail/Rapport04.2013/Rapport04.2013%20Anglais.pdf
Employee representatives make up one third of the members of the supervisory board in companies with more than 200 employees. But new legislation, passed in 2006, allowed single tier boards for the first time, and here employee rights are much weaker.
In companies with a two tier board system – both a supervisory and a management board – the works council has the right to nominate one third of the members of the supervisory board where the company has more than 200 employees. The one exception, introduced through legislation passed in 2006,[1] is where there is an agreement between the works council and management to the contrary. Before making the nomination the works council must consult with the unions in the company.
The supervisory board is responsible for the general direction of the company, while the day-to-day business is in the hands of the management board. (In practice, most supervisory boards only meet rarely.) However, the 2006 legislation (and the 2013 legislation which has replaced it) leaves the procedures of both the supervisory and management board to companies themselves to regulate. Previously there was more detailed legislative regulation.
In companies with a single tier board system – just a board of directors – employee participation at board level must be regulated by an agreement between the works council and the company. This marked a change – before the 2006 legislation only two tier board structures were possible – and it represents a potential weakening of employee representation at board level, as there are no minimum requirements.
Employee representatives must be company employees have the same rights and obligations as other members of the supervisory board. However, under legislation passed in 2013 they have lost their right to protection against dismissal. All supervisory board members are elected for a period of five years.
[1] The 2006 legislation has been replaced by new legislation passed in 2013 (Civil Code: Act V of 2013 Section 3:119 to 128), but this has not altered the basic principles of employee representation at board level.
European representatives from Hungary for both European Works Councils and the European Company are chosen by the works council, or central works council, if there is one. Only the appointment of board members to a European Company is different – they are chosen by the SE representative body.
European Works Councils
Hungarian members of the special negotiating body (SNB) for the EWC are appointed by the works council, or by the central works council, if there is one (jointly by all the central works councils if there is more than one). If there is no works council the workforce elects an employee representative.
The situation is the same for Hungarian members of the fallback EWC set up under the annex to the directive.
European Company
Hungarian members of the special negotiating body (SNB) for the European Company are appointed by the works council, or by the central works council, if there is one (jointly by all the central works councils if there is more than one). If there is no works council the workforce elects an employee representative. Trade unionists who are not employees of the companies concerned – that is full time officials – may be members of the SNB.
The situation is the same for members of the SE representative body set up under the annex to the directive, except that membership is limited to employees of the SE.
Employee representatives at board level in a European Company, under the terms of the annex to the directive, are chosen by the SE representative body and must also be employees of the SE.
Further information on the national SE legislation can be found here.
Elected health and safety representatives are the main way that the interests of employees are represented in the area of health and safety in Hungary. However, in larger employers there is also a joint health and safety committee, made up of representatives of both sides.
Basic approach at workplace level
The employer has a duty to ensure the existence of healthy and safe working conditions. However, employee health and safety representatives should cooperate with the employer in order to achieve this.
Employee health and safety bodies
The main structures representing employees in the area of health and safety are health and safety representatives (munkavédelmi képviselő), who can come together in their own employee-only health and safety committee (munkahelyi munkavédelmi bizottság), and, in larger employers, the joint health and safety committee (paritásos munkavédelmi testület) made up of representatives of both employees and the employer.
Numbers and structure
There is an obligation to have health and safety representatives in all organisations with 20 or more employees. (The threshold was reduced from 50 to 20 in July 2016 and had to be implemented in companies previously without health and safety representatives by April 2017. The change followed a sharp increase in the number of accidents at work.) In smaller organisations health and safety representatives must be elected if the local union organisation, the works council or a majority of employees want this. If there are no health and safety representatives, the employer should inform and consult the employees directly on health and safety issues.
Where there are three or more health and safety representatives, they can set up an employee-only health and safety committee, which the employer must attend if requested. This committee has the same rights as the health and safety representatives and is different from the joint health and safety committee – see below.
In organisations with 200 or more employees and where there are health and safety representatives, the employer should set up a joint health and safety committee with an equal number of representatives of the employer and the employees. The legislation states that the committee chair should alternate between a representative of the employees and the employers, but it leaves other matters, such as the number of the members, the rules of procedure and the precise activities of the committee, to be agreed between the employer and the employees’ representatives. Health and safety specialists employed by the company should also participate regularly in this joint committee.
Research by the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work in 2014, before the change in the law, found that 45% of workplaces in Hungary had health and safety representatives, somewhat below the EU-28 average of 58%. However, the proportion of workplaces in Hungary with a health and safety committee, at just 3%, is far below the EU-28 of 21%. This is not surprising given the relatively high threshold in Hungary before a health and safety committee must be established. (The figures are for workplaces with five or more employees.)[1]
Tasks and rights
The health and safety representatives or members of the employee-only health and safety committee have the right to monitor compliance with the appropriate health and safety obligations, and in particular to monitor:
- whether workplaces, work equipment and personal protective equipment are in safe condition;
- whether measures to safeguard health and prevent accidents have been carried out;
- whether employees have been trained and prepared to enable them to work safely.
In particular health and safety representatives or members of the employee-only health and safety committee may:
- enter the workplaces they cover during working hours and obtain information from employees working there;
- participate in the preparation of decisions by the employer that might have repercussions on employees' health and safety;
- request information from the employer concerning any issues related to healthy and safe working conditions;
- express opinions and make proposals to the employer;
- participate in accident investigations of occupational accidents and, where appropriate, in the investigation of the causes of occupational diseases;
- refer justified cases to the health and safety inspectorate.
They can also discuss health and safety issues with the labour inspectorate and, subject to the employer’s agreement, ask for experts for advice.
The employer must respond to any request for information or proposal for action within eight days. If the employer decides not to provide the information or agree to the proposal, this refusal must be explained in writing.
The health and safety representatives can also propose that the employer draws up a health and safety programme. If the employer refuses to do this and is of a certain size (this varies according to the nature of the hazards in the company), the health and safety representatives can initiate a collective labour dispute, which involves the intervention of a mediator.
Internal health and safety rules can only be issued with the agreement of the health and safety representatives or the employee-only health and safety committee.
The joint health and safety committee should:
- assess the health and safety situation in the company and measures that could be taken to improve it at least once a year;
- discuss the company’s health and safety programme and monitor its implementation; and
- comment on any internal health and safety regulations.
The joint health and safety committee should not affect the operation of the health and safety representatives.
Frequency of meetings
The legislation does not lay down rules on the frequency of meetings other than stating that the joint health and safety committee should review the health and safety situation at least annually.
Election and term of office
Where there are 20 or more employees an election by secret ballot must be organised to choose one or more health and safety representatives. In organisations with fewer than 20 employees an election to choose a safety representative must be organised if this is requested by the local union or by the works council or by the majority of the employees. The employer is responsible for organising the election, as well as providing the appropriate conditions for it to take place.Candidates must have at least six months’ service, although this does not apply in newly established companies.
The term of office is five years.
Members of the joint heath and safety committee (both full members and substitutes) are chosen by secret ballot of the health and safety representatives from among themselves. They also serve for five years.
Resources, time off and training
Health and safety representatives and committee members are entitled to sufficient paid time off to undertake their duties. Members of the joint health and safety committee are entitled to paid time off equivalent to a least 10% of their monthly working hours.
Health and safety representatives are also entitled to 16 hours of training in the first year following their election and eight hours annually in subsequent years. This training is paid for by the employer and should be conducted during normal working time.
Protection against dismissal
Health and safety representatives should not be disadvantaged because of the exercise of their duties and have the same protection against dismissal as local union representatives or members of the works council. This means that they can only be dismissed if the health and safety committee agrees or, if there is no committee, with the agreement of the employees who elected them.
Other elements of workplace health and safety
All employers must have access to the services of a health and safety expert, either by employing someone directly or by making use of an external health and safety organisation. However, in all organisations employing fewer than 10 people and in organisations employing 10 or more but fewer than 50 and operating in industries with a lower level of risk, the employer can take on this role, provided that he or she has the appropriate knowledge, skill and experience. In larger organisations, the level of qualifications of the health and safety expert, the number of such experts and the time they should spend on health and safety issues all depend on the number of employees and the level of hazards that can been expected.
The employer must also provide employees with access to an occupational health service, which can only be provided by qualified medical staff. As with the health and safety expert, this can be provided either internally or externally, and the skill and number of staff required vary in line with the number employed and the nature of the risk.
National context
The ministry responsible for health and safety at work is the Ministry for National Economy (Nemzetgazdasági Minisztérium - NGM). Monitoring compliance with health and safety laws and regulations is the responsibility of the Department of the Labour Inspection in the same ministry (Munkafelügyeleti Főosztály - NGM-MFF)
Trade unions and employers are able to influence health and safety policy through their membership of the Labour Health and Safety Committee (Munkavédelmi Bizottság).[2]
Hungary has made changes to its main health and safety legislation to take greater account of psychosocial risks. In January 2008 to the Act on Occupational Safety and Health was altered to impose a new duty on the employer to take account of psychosocial risks (§ 54(1d))as well as defining them (§ 87(1h)).
Key legislation
Act No. 93 of 1993 on Occupational Safety and Health, as amended
1993. évi XCIII. Törvény a munkavédelemről a végrehajtásáról szóló 5/1993. (XII. 26.) MüM rendelettel egységes szerkezetben
[1] Second European Survey of Enterprises on New and Emerging Risks, European Agency for Safety and Health at Work, 2016
[2] For more information on the national context see OSH system at national level – Hungary by Péter Nesztinger, and Gyula Szabó , OSH Wiki https://oshwiki.eu/wiki/OSH_system_at_national_level_-_Hungary
Employee participation, in the form of employee ownership, profit-sharing and cooperatives, has a long history in Hungary. The most important form is employee ownership, which enjoyed much support in the early years of privatization through the Hungarian Employee Share Ownership Programme. Despite the support in the early years, the relative weight of this ownership form decreased rapidly in recent years and is now quite insignificant.
In 1984 company self-government was institutionalised, allowing state enterprises to be managed by enterprise councils or assemblies elected by the workers. This measure laid the basis for the privatization process started after 1989.
The possibility of employees taking up shares in the companies they work for has existed in Hungary since 1988, when the law on business associations was first introduced; the current version of the law continues to contain these provisions. According to it, up to 10% of a private-sector company’s equity may be held by its workforce. This type of investment has however proved to have little long-term effect, with employees receiving shares from the companies they work for selling them as quickly as possible.1 var obj = document.getElementById('note_hidden'); obj.value = obj.value + '1
According to international surveys the incidence of workers’ participation schemes in Hungary is extremely low today. This applies to both employee share ownership and profit-sharing.
Between 1990 and 1992 employee ownership programmes on preferential terms were started in 540 companies.1 var obj = document.getElementById('note_hidden'); obj.value = obj.value + '1
The legal background of employee financial participation has its origins - with some exceptions - in the privatization process. There are three major forms of participation: share ownership, profit-sharing and the cooperative movement.
Share ownership
Employee share ownership had mainly three sources: the employee privatization on preferential terms, stock ownership programmes and holding shares in private companies.
Employee Privatization
Employee privatization on preferential terms was regulated by two laws: the 1991 Privatization Law abolished in favour of a new Privatization Law adopted in 1995, the 1995 Law XXXIX on Realisation of Entrepreneurial Property in State Ownership. According to this law, employee ownership in the course of privatization is possible through three financial techniques: price reduction, purchase by instalment and purchase on credit. A discount of up to 150% of the annual minimum salary can be granted, but the nominal value of shares acquired this way may not exceed 15% of the company’s registered capital and the discount may not exceed 50% of the purchase price. The allowance can be used either individually, or in an organised form.1 var obj = document.getElementById('note_hidden'); obj.value = obj.value + '1
1. See also Lowitzsch, J. et.al (2006): The PEPPER III Report: Country Report Hungary”.
At national level, trade unions participated in the elaboration of the various forms of employee financial ownership during privatization. Today although the trade unions show an interest in employees’ financial participation they are not active in that regard.
Employee share ownership played an important role in the establishment of the National Works Council Federation (Munkástanácsok Országos Szövetsége), one of the trade union associations set up in Hungary’s economic transformation phase. The first works council was set up in a porcelain plant. This company went on to become a prototype for employee share ownership schemes. The national organisation lobbied for a statutory framework for employee financial participation schemes as a partner of Hungary’s first post-Communist government.
Local or company unions, however, were often passive and limited action to declaring their interest in employee buy-outs, but did not play any role in organising the procedure. In other cases, however, local trade unions actively lobbied for preferential shares as well as for ESOP buy-outs.
Trade unions did not formally participate in organising and running the ESOP in any of the companies, however.
Currently, trade unions are showing a certain amount of interest in employee financial participation, but there is no active support.1 var obj = document.getElementById('note_hidden'); obj.value = obj.value + '1
- The Hungarian ESOP Association
- Galgóczi, B. & Hovorka, J. (1997): Employee ownership in Hungary: The role of employer's and workers' organizations. Interdepartmental Action Programme on Privatization, Restructuring and Economic Democracy. Working Paper IPPRED-11.
- Lowitzsch, J. et.al (2006): The PEPPER III Report: Promotion of Employee Participation in Profits and Enterprise Results in the New Member and Candidate Countries of the European Union, Rome/Berlin: Inter-University Centre at the Institute for Eastern European Studies.
- Lowitzsch, J., Hashi, I. & Woodward, R. (2009): The PEPPER IV Report: Benchmarking of Employee Participation in Profits and Enterprise Results in the Member and Candidate Countries of the European Union. Country Profile “Hungary”.
- European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (2010): European Company Survey 2009. Overview. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (2012): Fifth European Working Conditions Survey, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- Mygind, N. (2012): Trends in employee ownership in Eastern Europe, in: The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 23:8, 1611-1642.
- Poutsma, E.; Lighard, P. (2011): Compensation and Benefits, in: Cranet Survey on Comparative Human Resource Management – International Executive Report.
- Clifford Chance (2010): Employee Share Plans in Europe and the USA.
Trade Unions
(members of the National Economic and Social Council)
- MSZOSZ - Confederation of Hungarian Trade Unions (En)
- LIGA - Democratic Confederation of Free Trade Unions (En)
- MOSz - National Federation of Workers' Councils
- SZEF - Forum for the Cooperation of Trade Unions (En)
- PDSZ - Teachers' Democratic Union of Hungary (En)
- VDSZ - Federation of Chemical, Energy and Allied Workers' Unions (En)
- VDSZSZ - Free Trade Union of Rail Workers
Employers’ confederations
(members of the National Economic and Social Council)
- MGYOSZ - Confederation of Hungarian Employers and Industrialists (En)
- VOSZ - National Association of Entrepreneurs and Employers (En)
- IPOSZ - Hungarian Association of Craftmen's Corporations (En)
- KISOSZ - National Federation of Traders and Caterers (Hu)
- STRATOSZ - National Association of Strategic and Public Utility Companies (En)
- ÁFEOSZ-COOP - National Federation of Consumer Co-operative Societies and Trade Associations (En)
- AMSZ - National Federation of Agricultural Employers
- MOSZ - National Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives and Producers (Hu)
Government
- NGM - Ministry for National Economy (En)
- TPK - Social Dialouge Centre (Hu)